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1 . 1 Background
In April of 1986 the President's Commission on Defense
Management published a report on defense acquisition [1].
The commission had been formed, in part, to help deal with
Department of Defense problems related to overpriced spare
parts, test deficiencies, and cost and schedule overruns.
Their analysis led to the conclusion that the defense acqui-
sition process has fundamental problems that must be cor-
rected. These problems are deeply entrenched and have
developed over several decades as a result of an expanding
bureaucracy with its tendency for overregulation . As a
result, too many weapon systems cost too much, take too loni
to develop, and, by the time they are fielded, feature obso-
lete technology. The typical acquisition cycle time, from
the time a mission or system requirement is defined until
the system is operational, has grown to twelve or fifteen
years or more for complex systems.
In the opinion of the President's commission it should
be possible to cut this cycle time in half by implementing
the following recommendations:
* streamline acquisition organization and
procedures
,
* expand the use of commercial products,
* increase the use of competition,
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* enhance the quality of acquisition personnel,
* balance cost and performance,
* stabilize programs, and
* use technology to reduce costs and schedules.
It is the last recommendation that is central to this
thesis. In the broadest context this thesis is about the
effects modern construction technologies have on defense
acquisition practices. In particular it is about the
effects they have on naval ship acquisition practices and
shipbuilding productivity.
Many discussions of naval ship acquisition begin with
the acknowledgment that major defense weapons systems are
the most technically complex of any in existence. And it
can be argued that the most complex of weapons systems are
naval ships
.
Ships are the largest mobile objects on Earth and naval
ships represent an integration of a multitude of major and
minor related systems of which many are extremely complex in
their own right. A nuclear-powered aircraft carrier is over
1100 feet long, displaces over 90,000 tons of sea water, and
is propelled at speeds in excess of 30 knots by power plants
rated at over 200,000 shaft horsepower. It is also an air-
port with a capacity of 100 or more jet aircraft. Addition-
ally, it is a self-contained city with a population of over
5,000 people. Its mult i -reactor nuclear plant, various
electronic systems and aircraft launching and recovery sys-
11

terns take years to design and test before they are ready for
installation and use in the fleet.
Unfortunately, the complexity of the hardware in ques-
tion is perhaps only matched by the complexity of the
bureaucracy and process concerned with the acquisition of
the hardware. During World War II, the entire Navy Depart-
ment in Washington, D. C., charged with directing an effort
involving, at the peak of the war, thousands of ships, con-
sisted of about 200 people. Today there are in excess of
20,000 people in the Washington, D. C. area employed by the
Navy. The active fleet today consists of close to 600
ships
.
As indicated earlier, it commonly takes twelve to fif-
teen years to conceive, develop, design, and construct a new
U. S. Navy ship class. The problems of long range fiscal
forecasting and engineering development in an unstable
political and economic environment, coupled with rapid
technological advances, are mind boggling. Any technology
or methodology that offers to reduce the cycle time and the
costs of the acquisition process deserves close study and
development
.
1 . 2 Thesis Overview and Objectives
Modern shipbuilding practices in the United States have
evolved from the requirement to build naval ships as econom-
ically as possible while still retaining the desired level
12

of quality and the ability to fulfill naval mission require-
ments. The highly competitive environment that shipbuilders
are now in has further stimulated their search for more
efficient and productive ship construction methods. As a
result, group technology-based shipbuilding methods have
been developed and implemented over the last few years.
These new construction technologies have profound effects on
the manner in which naval ship acquisition is, or should be,
conducted. In particular, there are serious consequences
regarding engineering and design, CAD/CAM, ship work break-
down structures, and cost and schedule control systems.
The second chapter of the thesis begins with a discus-
sion of the four distinct strategies employed in defense
systems acquisition since World War II. The reader should
gain from this material background knowledge about the naval
ship acquisition process and environment. Included is a
description of the naval ship design process as viewed by
the Naval Sea Systems Command ( NAVSEA ) , the organization
within the U. S. Navy responsible for acquiring ship sys-
tems. Next is a brief history of the development of modern
shipbuilding methods in the United States, their subsequent
transfer to and improvement in Japan, and finally their
return to the United States. The chapter ends with a tech-
nical overview of ship produc ibi 1 i ty and modern shipbuilding
methods. Included here is a discussion of group technology;
product-oriented work breakdown structures; planning for
13

production; process flow lanes; zone construction, outfit-
ting, and painting methods; and accuracy control. Since
this material has been recently collected in a comprehensive
treatment of modern ship production methodology and prac-
tices, the discussion is brief [2],
With the above information established, Chapter 3 then
considers the impacts modern shipbuilding methods have on
the naval ship acquisition process. The particular areas
considered are design and engineering, CAD/CAM, ship work
breakdown structures, and cost and schedule control systems.
Included are detailed examples of how modern shipbuilding
methods have affected selected acquisition programs. The
programs considered include the TAO 187 class fleet oiler
shipbuilding program, the DDG 51 class destroyer shipbuild-
ing program, and the SSBN 726 class Trident ballistic mis-
sile submarine shipbuilding program.
Based on the discussions of Chapter 3, the final chap-
ter offers conclusions and recommendations on how the naval
ship acquisition process may be changed so that the improve-
ments thus far made in ship construction methods may further
reduce ship acquisition construction times and costs.
14
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NAVAL SHIP ACQUISITION AND SHIPBUILDING,
WORLD WAR II TO PRESENT
2 . 1 Post World War II Naval Ship Acquisition
2.1.1 Introduction
An overview of the structure and process of naval ship
acquisition in the United States since World War II is
presented in this section. Four distinct periods are iden-
tifiable: the conventional period (until the early 1960's),
the total package procurement period (also called the con-
cept formulation/contract definition or the McNamara period,
after the then Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara)
which began in the early 1960's and ended about 1969, the
post McNamara period which ended about 1979, and the current
period. Although the major policies and characteristics of
the four periods differ considerably, it is not always pos-
sible to categorize a particular ship acquisition project as
being a result of the policies of any one period. For
example, the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier project
(Nimitz Class) was conceived during the conventional period,
continued through the total package procurement and post
McNamara periods, and remains an ongoing project. It has
characteristics of all four policy periods. The ships were
designed primarily by the Navy ("in house") with the aid of
a design agent, typical of the conventional, post McNamara,
16

and current periods. Some of the ships were constructed
under a multi-ship, multi-year contract, which is character-
istic of the total package procurement and post McNamara
periods
.
Thus, as the different periods are described, it should
be remembered that ship projects are long (twelve to fifteen
years or more) and often transcend major acquisition policy
shifts. Additionally, like any large bureaucracy, new poli-
cies and strategies from top management (the Secretary of
Defense) often do not take effect at the working level (the
ship projects) for two or three years, if at all.
2.1.2 The Basic Process
Although policies and organizational structures for
designing and acquiring ships for the United States Navy
have changed over the years, the basic process remains much
the same. Also, though differing in details and nomencla-
ture, the acquisition of ships, at the most basic level, is
similar to the acquisition of other major defense systems.
A need is identified; a requirement based on that need is
established; a weapon system is selected, designed, devel-
oped and constructed to fill the requirement. Sometimes
technological breakthroughs motivate a new acquisition but
attempts are made to ensure that a legitimate need, and not
"technology push", precedes the development and construction
of a new system.
17

The Navy and other services are charged with identify-
ing needs and defining, developing, and producing systems to
satisfy those needs [1]. Establishing overall acquisition
policy, passing on the validity of needs, and monitoring the
performance of the services in carrying out the policy is
the responsibility of the Office of the Secretary of Defense
[2] .
National defense policies and objectives are provided
by the Secretary of Defense and translated by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff into military policies and objectives.
Planning and programming by the services are keyed to these
objectives. Evaluation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff guid-
ance may lead to research and development objectives formu-
lation by the services to satisfy deficiencies in their
capabilities to perform their respective missions [3]. The
Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) is the budget for this
effort and for the weapons systems which emerge from the
research and development efforts [4],
The POM is part of the Department of Defense Planning,
Programming, and Budgeting System ( PPBS ) . Funding for weap-
ons systems is obtained through the PPBS. However, a series
of approvals by intra-service organizations and the top
level Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council ( DSARC ) is
also currently required before a new weapons system is
built. The role of the DSARC will be discussed in more
detail later in this section.
18

2.1.3 The Conventional Period
At the end of World War II the U. S. Navy deactivated
most of its fleet and ship production virtually ceased. Dur-
ing the Korean conflict most of the required ships were
reactivated World War II-era ships. Finally, in 1952, the
Navy directed the construction of 31 major ships [5].
Acquisition practices were characterized by an itera-
tive design process accomplished by the Navy or by an inde-
pendent design agent working for the Navy. Their products
included a complete construction bid package with little
documentation. The major emphasis was on ship performance
and production contracts were often split between two or
more shipbuilders. There was little involvement by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense. The acquisition process
was basically decentralized to the service level.
Initially, the entire design and procurement effort
would be coordinated by a few people. They relied on vari-
ous functional organizations to perform the necessary design
and acquisition work required. Different organizations
would be responsible for various systems on the ship. For
example, the Bureau of Ordnance was responsible for weapons.
Later, starting with the Polaris ballistic missile program,
the trend was toward project manager-type organizations.
Production contracts were spread among several ship-
yards to facilitate more rapid delivery of ships and to aid
in preserving the shipbuilding and ship mobilization indus-
19

trial base. Of course, regional political and economic
pressures also played a role.
As shown in Figure 2.1, the conventional approach
involved Navy personnel formulating a ship concept. This
activity included cost and feasibility studies and possibly
advanced research and development. Assuming budgetary
approval was obtained, increasingly refined design stages,
termed preliminary design and contract design followed. This
approach did not employ systems analysis techniques.
The resulting product was a bid package, including
complete contract plans and specifications. The bid package
could result in any number of procurement contracts. Lead
ships were often built in Navy shipyards. The amphibious
ships LPD 7 through 15 were built under four contracts by
two shipbuilders. Exclusive of the costs of changes to the
contracts, these ships were delivered to the Navy at an
average of 25% over the initial contract price and 27 months
behind schedule [7]. Escalation due to inflation and claims
against the government accounted for most of the cost over-
runs. These results became increasingly typical. Low or
negative profit performance precipitated many of the claims.
The basis for the claims was usually a dispute over inter-
pretation of the complex and detailed contract specifica-
tions. Also, production facilities were becoming antiquated
and uncompeteti ve in the world market. Support of the ships
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Figure 2.1 Comparison of the Development Sequence of the
Navy's Earlier Ship Acquisition Methods [6]
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tion among ships of a given class and among classes of
ships
.
2.1.4 The Total Package Procurement Period
A radically different approach to weapons design and
acquisition was formulated in the early 1960's by the Office
of the Secretary of Defense under Robert S. McNamara. The
new approach centralized major decision authority in McNa-
mara's office. Objectives were:
a) optimization of cost effectiveness by using systems
analysis techniques;
b) reduction or elimination of contractor claims
against the government by using contractor-prepared perfor-
mance oriented specifications instead of government-imposed
detailed specifications;
c) reduction of cost overruns by transferring financial
risk to the contractors for the design and acquisition
phases through the use of fixed price contracts;
d) significant capitalization increases in shipbuilding
facilities by using multi-ship, multi-year contract awards
to a single shipbuilder (This was expected to provide long
term financial security, thus enabling large-scale capital-
ization and expansion of facilities to accommodate delivery
schedule demands);
e) reduction of unique systems and subsystems prolif-
eration which had resulted from split production contracts;
22

f) introduction of producibili ty and innovation into
designs by having the shipbuilder design the system;
g) lower acquisition costs by taking advantage of the
learning curve effect made possible through single-producer
serial production; and
h) more accurate total cost estimates and reduction of
poor ship support by making the contractor responsible for
all on-board systems, crew training, initial repair parts,
support facilities, and other logistics details [8].
A project manager-type organization was directed for
all major programs [9]. As outlined in Figure 2.1, the
services still conducted research and development and iden-
tified the desired performance characteristics of the weapon
system during the concept formulation stage. Assuming
approval by the Secretary of Defense, a contract definition
period followed. A request for proposal ( RFP ) was prepared
by the Navy and issued to selected shipbuilders to prepare
design analyses based on the specified performance charac-
teristics. The RFP contained both mandatory and desirable
performance specifications and were supposed to encourage
alternatives and stimulate initiative and creativity on the
part of the contractors [10].
After evaluation of the proposals by the Navy, normally
two or more contractors were awarded fixed price contracts
to develop a complete shipbuilding proposal. Required in
these proposals were contract plans and specifications,
23

detailed construction plans, management plans, and a com-
plete analysis of life cycle costs [11]. Life cycle costs
are the total costs of acquisition and ownership, including
development, production, deployment, operation, and mainte-
nance .
No longer than six months was allowed for the contract
definition phase. This was followed by a source selection
process during which a detailed analysis of the proposals
was conducted by the procuring service. Negotiation was
conducted with one or more of the potential contractors. At
the conclusion of the evaluation period a recommendation was
sent to the Office of the Secretary of Defense to award a
multi-year, multi-ship contract to the selected contractor,
to conduct further contract definition, or to defer or
abandon the effort. The single contract award was fixed
price, with or without incentive clauses.
The Navy conducted three total package procurement ship
competitions. The Fast Deployment Logistics ship was not
funded by Congress. The Amphibious Helicopter Assault ships
( LHA class) and the SPRUANCE class destroyers were funded
and their acquisition programs completed. Litton Industries
won all three competitions [12].
The USS Spruance was the first ship delivered under
either contract and was accepted by the Navy in 1975. How-
ever, the acquisitions were beset by many of the same prob-
lems that characterized defense weapons procurement during
24

the previous period - large cost and schedule overruns.
This was particularly true of the LHA contract. The first
LHA was delivered years behind schedule, even after the
original contract was renegotiated, allowing for a higher
contract price and later delivery date.
By the late 1960 's, cost and schedule overruns and
performance shortfalls of new weapons systems were daily
newspaper fare. In 1971 the Department of Defense Com-
ptroller conducted a survey of 35 major development and
production programs [13]. Only two of the programs were
found to be on, or ahead of, schedule. That same year the
General Accounting Office made a survey of 61 weapon systems
and found that cost estimates for them had increased $33.4
billion over the initial estimates [14]. Contractor costs
soared and profits plummeted. The term "contractor bailout"
became a household word as one producer after another
threatened to cease production unless relief from the fixed
price contracts was provided.
By 1970 a number of studies had found serious flaws in
the management of the weapons acquisition process. As a
result, on May 28, 1970, Deputy Secretary of Defense David
Packard issued a memorandum which stated that the total
package procurement approach to developing and acquiring
major weapon systems was unsatisfactory and that a new pol-
icy would soon be established [15]. The Navy was still
years away from delivery of its first ship procured under
25

the canceled policy. The overall conclusion was that the
long term objectives of total package procurement were never
met. It is a fact that the sole source multi-year contracts
resulted in the construction of a new shipyard by Litton
Industries in Pascagoula, Mississippi. However, Litton had
problems in developing an adequate design and production
force and in making the new facility operationally efficient
during the performance period of their contracts.
2.1.5 The Post McNamara Period
The major policies and trends of ship acquisition fol-
lowing the demise of total package procurement included:
a) emphasis on constrained design ("design-to-cost"),
b) emphasis on proven hardware ( " f ly-before-you-buy " )
,
c) required review and approval to proceed by the DSARC
at key milestones,
d) a prohibition against total package procurement,
e) improvement in cost estimating,
f
)
flexibility in contract type and liberalization of
contract escalation (due to inflation) clauses,
g) use of contractors for "in-house" ship design, and
h) tailoring of acquisition approaches to each project.
The cancellation of the key top level policy directive
[16] for the total package procurement period in 1970 left a
guidance void that was not formally filled until the issu-
26

ance of Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, "Acquisition
of Major Defense Systems", on July 13, 1971. It was during
this same period that then Chief of Naval Operations Elmo
Zumwalt directed the rapid development of a large class of
austere, relatively inexpensive Guided Missile Frigates ( FFG
class) to bolster the size of the rapidly diminishing fleet
[17]. They provided the "low" end of the so called "high
mix/low mix" fleet concept.
After a year of feasibility studies, Admiral Zumwalt
directed that the design would not violate constraints which
were set on the average follow ship acquisition cost, fully
loaded displacement, and maximum number of accommodations
[18]. Performance capability above the minimum specified
was to be traded-off to stay within the constraints. This
method of ship design, commonly termed "design-to-cost", was
revolutionary to the Navy, but was common in industry for
new product development.
A major program consideration was that "discrete cost
elements (e.g., unit production cost, operating and support
cost) shall be translated into 'design to' requirements"
[19]. In October, 1973 the major services' material com-
mands issued the "Joint Design-to-Cost Guide" [20]. This
directive required that "design-to-cost" methodology be used
for most major systems.
Historically, performance requirements for new ships
had been dictated by the Chief of Naval Operations to the
27

material command in brief "single sheet characteristics"
[21]. These were used by the material command to develop
preliminary designs and cost estimates leading to more
detailed characteristics statements, and ultimately to pro-
curement specifications [22]. Costs were considered but
were usually secondary to maximizing performance.
"Design-to-cost" elevated the importance of acquisition
cost to the same level as performance in the design process.
As a result, a new performance-cost tradeoff dialogue
between the customer (Chief of Naval Operations) and pro-
ducer (Chief of Naval Material) organizations was required.
"Top Level Requirements and Top Level Specifications for the
Development of Naval Ships", Chief of Naval Operations
Instruction 9010.300, was issued early in 1974. It detailed
a procedure which provided for a working level group (the
Ship Acquisition and Improvement Council) to develop the
performance parameters for a baseline ship which would meet
the established mission requirements. The group also speci-
fied allowable variations in performance parameters and
alternative system selections for the ship class [23].
After a period of feasibility studies during which the
impact of the alternative performance parameters and systems
selections were evaluated, the Chief of Naval Operations
prepared a draft of the Top Level Requirements ( TLR ) . This
document was revised as the Naval Material Command (parent
command of NAVSEA , for whom acquisition projects worked
28

directly) developed a conceptual design for the ship class
and provided cost and design information to the Chief of
Naval Operations. Assuming approval from the Chief of Naval
Operations to proceed with a selected design, a "conceptual
baseline" and a "cost goal" for the average follow ship
acquisition were presented to the DSARC, which is composed
of high level officials in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense. If DSARC and Secretary of Defense approval were
given to proceed into preliminary design, a draft Top Level
Specification was initiated by the Naval Material Command.
This companion document to the TLR translates the TLR into a
physical ship description [24],
The large performance shortfalls, schedule delays, and
cost increases referred to earlier in this chapter were at
least partially a result of overly optimistic estimates of
ultimate system capabilities and the time required to design
and perfect them [25]. There had been a great deal of
reliance on "paper studies" rather than on actual perfor-
mance demonstrations. Thus, a major program consideration
of the post McNamara period was to ensure that achievement
of program objectives was assured prior to full-scale prod-
uction [26]. The goal was to eliminate technical and cost
risks. A supporting Department of Defense directive was
issued in January of 1973 to establish test and evaluation
policy for the acquisition of defense systems [27],
29

The key practice which grew from recognition of the
need for increased test and evaluation during the acquisi-
tion process was prototyping. This is sometimes known as
the "f ly-before-you-buy" policy and was used in the Navy's
air-cushioned landing craft ( LCAC ) program. However, it is
not feasible to build and evaluate prototypes prior to
beginning follow ship design and production for large ships.
The time required, small number of ships usually involved,
and threat of obsolescence dictated a modified approach.
In such a modified approach, the FFG program developed
a plan which provided for:
a) early construction of land based test facilities
(LBTFs) for complete propulsion and combat systems testing,
and
b) a delay of two years between construction contract
awards for the lead and follow ships [28].
This plan permitted testing of the two major high risk
subsystems prior to installation on the lead ship and time
to incorporate changes resulting from the test and evalua-
tion program into the design of the follow ships. The LBTFs
were also useful for crew training.
The DSARC was mentioned earlier and will be explained
more fully now. It was established in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense by then Deputy Secretary of Defense
David Packard in May, 1969 [29]. The purpose of the council
30

was to review and evaluate the status of major defense sys-
tems acquisitions at critical milestones.
Formal documentation for the DSARC reviews and deci-
sions was provided by the project-prepared Decision Coordi-
nating Paper (DCP), formerly called the Development Concept
Paper. It was a summary document that recorded the primary
information on a program. Included were thresholds, risks, a
statement of need, alternatives, rationales for decisions,
and af f ordabi 1 i ty considerations. When signed by the Secre-
tary of Defense, it provided the authority for the service
to proceed to the next step in the program. His decision
set the limits of authority within which the project was
obligated to stay [30].
A long series of intra-service briefings and reviews
was generally required of an acquisition project prior to a
DSARC presentation.
As more and more contractors failed to perform under
the total package procurement fixed price contracts, the
need for increased government involvement with its contrac-
tors was realized. The fixed price contracts and the lack
of government involvement in the design supposedly trans-
ferred any financial risks from the government to the con-
tractor and thus the role of the acquisition projects was
basically that of monitoring, with little control leverage.
During the post McNamara period the top level acquisi-
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tion policy directive specified that the contract type
should be consistent with all program characteristics,
including risk. Also stipulated was that cost-type con-
tracts were preferable where substantial development effort
was involved [31]. The use of cost-type contracts allowed
the possibility of increased government involvement.
Apart from the lack of governmental control leverage
resulting from fixed price contracts, attempts at effective
contractor cost and schedule control by the projects had
historically been hampered by:
a) a reluctance of the contractors to share what it
considered to be proprietary information,
b) the preoccupation of project managers with the
annual funding approval process and the continuity of funds
control as opposed to cost control,
c) the proliferation of various information and cost
control systems imposed on contractors by the different
services and projects (validity of the information was often
lost in the translation from the contractor's system to the
government imposed system(s) ),
d) the exclusion in the reporting systems of the bud-
geted cost of work performed,
e) improper allocation of contractor costs between
overhead (indirect) and direct costs,
f
)
inability of the project personnel to evaluate the
detailed information they require of the contractor, and
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lack of correspondence between reported data and the con-
tractor's own data,
g) retroactive changing of financial plans to conform
to work performed to date (the so-called "rubber baseline"),
and
h) contractor use of nonintegrated work breakdown
structures and nonintegrated charts of cost accounts (sum of
budget dollars for work at one level may exceed budget at
next higher level). [32]
In a survey conducted during the 1960's, it was found
that most program managers were satisfied if their funds
control reports indicated that funds were being expended at
the planned monthly rate and their PERT network reports [33]
showed no significant schedule slippage [34]. Schedule
network reporting based on starts rather than completions,
untimely or inaccurate reporting, and the lack of perfor-
mance of scheduled noncritical path work all served to build
in cost overruns which often went undiscovered until it was
too late to take any meaningful cost or schedule control
action
.
In 1967 the Department of Defense issued a directive
entitled "Performance Measurement for Selected Acquisi-
tions" [35]. The system may be summarized as follows:
a) Part One of the program requires that contractors
use internal planning and control systems that meet minimum
government criteria. These criteria are called the "Cost
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and Schedule Control Systems Criteria" (CSCSC).
b) Part Two of the program requires that contractors
regularly submit Cost Performance Reports ( CPRs ) which con-
tain information on the budgeted cost of work performed to
date. The criteria themselves do not require the submission
of any reports to the government, but specify the reporting
capabilities which contractors' internal systems must have,
and the types of data the systems should be able to produce.
The contractor is free to design this internal planning and
control systems to correspond to the manner in which he
organizes his work units and assigns responsibility for
performing work [36].
The goal of CSCSC is to provide a reliable means of
measuring schedule variance, SV , and cost variance, CV
,
periodically over the course of a particular contract. This
is done by calculating the following values, referenced to
the same time period:
ACWP = actual cost of work performed
BCWP = budgeted cost of work performed
BCWS = budgeted cost of work scheduled
CV and SV may then be calculated as follows:
CV r ACWP - BCWP
SV = BCWS - BCWP
During the performance period of a contract, a positive
CV indicates a cost overrun and a positive SV indicates a




An important concept in the reporting criteria is that
the contract cost status reports must be based strictly on
the number of jobs completed to date.
Five years after the CSCSC had been developed, only 16
defense contractors had been certified as complying with the
criteria. The Navy was singled out by the Senate Armed
Services Committee as being particularly slow in implement-
ing the new system [37], In 1971 an additional twenty con-
tractors complied with the criteria and all three services
were actively implementing the program and training person-
nel in its use [38].
As indicated, the FFG program pioneered many of the
reforms of the post McNamara period. In addition to those
aspects already discussed, a key element of the period was
to select a lead and a secondary contractor early in the
design effort. The function of the lead shipbuilder was to
assist in the in-house design effort and ultimately to build
the lead ship under a cost plus fee type of contract. The
purpose of this was to introduce producibil i ty into the
design, to promote design familiarity and acceptance of per-
formance characteristics by the contractor, and to reduce
the development time [39].
The secondary shipbuilder was involved to prevent the
introduction of producibi 1 i ty bias by the lead shipbuilder,
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which would result in unfair advantage when bidding on the
follow ship contracts, and to provide a fallback position in
case lead ship contract negotiations failed. When the first
increment of follow ship fixed price contract bids were
received in 1975, the Navy was dismayed to receive bids from
only two contractors - the lead and secondary contractors.
Moreover, the bid prices were well in excess of the
"design-to-cost" constraint. The lack of participation in
the bidding by other shipbuilders and the high bids sub-
mitted were due to one or more of the following:
a) shipyard loading by other (mainly merchant ship)
contracts
,
b) poor profit and loss experience on previous con-
tracts
,
c) a reluctance to accept the required involvement by
the government in the contractor's procedures and oper-
ations
,
d) fear that the escalation provided for inflation
would be insufficient, as it had been in the past, and
e) the Navy's cost estimate was far too low.
These difficulties in the FFG program are generally
considered to have been the result of past project problems
and not an indication of failure of the post McNamara period
reforms. It is interesting to note that the FFG 61, the
last of the FFG 7 class, is due for delivery late in 1988.
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2.1.6 The Current Period
If the total package procurement and post McNamara
periods can be described as periods of radical changes in
ship acquisition policy, then the current period is one of
evolutionary change. It can therefore be described most
conveniently in terms of the ways in which it differs from
the previous period.
During the 1980 's the watchwords of defense procurement
have been "competition" and "acquisition streamlining". The
Navy has responded to DoD initiatives in these areas by
creating within the Navy Secretariat the positions of Navy
Competition Advocate General ( CAG ) and Navy Specification
Control Advocate (SPECAG). Both of these positions are
under the Navy Acquisition Executive, who is the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Shipbuilding and Logistics
(ASN(S&L)) [40].
The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 requires
that full and open competition be used wherever possible in
procurement of services and material. Each ship acquisition
project manager (SHAPM) must therefore ensure that competi-
tion is provided for in his acquisition plan ( AP ) . Any
deviation from full and open competition must be justified
by the SHAPM and approved by ASN ( S&L) . There are seven
exceptions to full and open competition and they include:
* existence of only one responsible source
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* unusual or compelling urgency
* industrial mobilization
* international agreement
* authorization or requirement by statute
* national security considerations
* and public interest considerations. [41]
Since ship acquisitions rarely fall into any of these cate-
gories, and since domestic commercial ship production is
almost nonexistent, competition among the Navy's shipbuild-
ers has become intense over the last decade. This competi-
tion partially accounts for the recent development and use
of more efficient shipbuilding methods by U. S. shipbuild-
ers .
However, there is concern in the U. S. defense industry
that the emphasis on competition is being carried too far.
There is evidence in recent procurements that, in the face
of increasing competitive pressures, some contractors have
been "low balling" or "buying-in" to contracts with the hope
that anticipated contract changes will offer the opportunity
to recoup what would otherwise have been an almost certain
loss. There is concern within both industry and the govern-
ment that such practices may be the prelude to a return to
the bitter claims era of the 1960s and early 1970s [42].
Acquisition streamlining is any action taken to reduce
cost and time of acquisition while maintaining or improving
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product quality. The objective of streamlining is to iden-
tify, develop and implement improvements in the acquisition
process. This includes ensuring that only innovative and
cost-effective acquisition requirements are included in
shipbuilding solicitations and contract specifications.
Management requirements specified in the contract should be
the minimum required to satisfy program needs while allowing
the contractor the flexibility he may need to incorporate
improvements into his shipbuilding system. The concept of
acquisition streamlining calls upon industry to be involved
early in the acquisition process by recommending cost-
effective solutions to shipbuilding problems.
SHAPMs are required to fulfill the objectives of
acquisition streamlining in their specification and contract
development. After contract design they must certify to the
SPECAG that all streamlining requirements have been met
[43] .
The basic steps of naval ship design prior to the
issuing of an RFP are largely unchanged from those of the
post McNamara period, as can be seen in Figure 2.2. [44]
This figure illustrates the dialogue that takes place
between the Chief of Naval Operations ( OPNAV ) and the Naval
Sea Systems Command ( NAVSEA ) . An important element of the
organization in OPNAV that has yet to be mentioned is the


























TOR - TENTATIVE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
DOP - DEVELOPMENT OPTIONS PAPER
OR - OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
PDR - PRELIMINARY DESIGN REPORT
TLR - TOP LEVEL REQUIREMENTS
CDR - CONTRACT DESIGN REPORT
RFP - REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL
Figure 2.2 OPNAV/NAVSEA Ship Design Dialogue [44]
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all the principal warfare sponsors and other high-
ranking members of OPNAV's staff. It is their job to pass
judgment on all ship designs proposed by NAVSEA [44].
Examination of the post World War II acquisition stra-
tegies has revealed that the acquisition approaches employed
in the decades of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s represent not
only fundamentally different strategies from each other, but
also that for each of these periods there was a reasonably
well-defined strategy. The success or failure of these
strategies may be debated but there is general agreement as
to what these approaches were supposed to be.
Unlike these previous periods, there is no one dominant
strategy for accomplishing naval ship design in the present
decade. Rather, the precise approach to be used on a new
ship acquisition is decided on a case-by-case basis at the
beginning of each ship acquisition and is stated in that
program's AP . As a result, the contract design approach
employed on the SSN 21 design differed markedly from that
used on the DDG 51 design. And LHD , SWATH TAGOS , MSH, and
MHC all have their own approaches. This evolution in acqui-
sition strategies is shown in Figure 2.3.
It might be argued that unnecessary confusion and delay
occurs at the beginning of each new ship design until the
strategy is determined. However, the technical and manage-




























Figure 2.3 Summary of Naval Ship Design Approaches [44]
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warship are such that this approach will be increasingly
necessary in the future.
2 . 2 A Brief History of Modern Shipbuilding Methods
In 1942 the German Navy was sinking Allied shipping
faster than the Allies could produce ships. However, by
mid-1943 that problem had been turned around and American
shipyards were producing ships faster than they were being
sunk. This success was largely the result of industrial
engineering techniques brought to the shipbuilding industry
by industrialist Henry J. Kaiser. He and his organization
had never built a ship prior to 1942 and therefore they
brought few preconceived notions to the problem of effi-
ciently producing ships.
He introduced the concept of group technology, that is,
organizing work by the problems inherent to manufacturing,
to American shipbuilding. This product-oriented approach,
vice the traditional systems-oriented approach, allowed
Kaiser's yards to achieve benefits normally associated only
with production lines [45]. Welding was done in a downhand
position only, both because this was faster and because
there was a scarcity of experienced welders during the war.
Also to facilitate welding, ship's bows were built sideways,
deckhouses upside down and the sides of ships on the ground,
rather than from high, often precarious, and costly scaf-
folding. The governing principle was to organize the work
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to fit the worker.
As a result of his methods, Kaiser's Liberty ships were
delivered in two-thirds the time and at three-fourths the
cost of those built by traditional shipbuilders [46].
After World War II, Elmer Hann , a former general sup-
erintendent at one of Kaiser's yards, brought Kaiser's
methods to Japan, whose shipyards were intentionally left
untouched by the Allies during the war. After the war,
Japan desired to use its shipbuilding capacity and Elmer
Hann taught the Japanese the organization of work in accor-
dance with the principles of group technology, welding
without distortion to control costs, and the importance of
college-educated middle managers trained in the entire
shipbuilding system. With these methods and only pre-World
War II shipyards, Japanese yards were producing 40 percent
of the world's total shipbuilding tonnage by 1964 [47].
A contemporary of Hann ' s was Dr. W. Edwards Deming, a
professor of statistics from New York University. He
introduced the notion of statistical control methods ( SCM
)
to Japanese industry. Statistical control radically
improved quality, laid the foundation of modern ship con-
struction methods, and made it possible to develop automated
and specialized welding.
With the application of SCM, management systems began
to furnish workers with meaningful indicators of how work
processes performed. For the first time, it was possible to
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evaluate the impact on work processes of even the smallest
innovations. This, in turn, gave rise to quality circles,
and as a result, people at all levels in a modern Japanese
shipyard participate in problem solving on a daily basis
[48].
Dr. Hisashi Shinto initially worked for Elmer Hann as
his chief engineer. After Hann and other Americans returned
home, Shinto became the head of the Ishikawa j imi-Har ima
Heavy Industries Co., Ltd. ( IHI ) shipyard at Kure . Using
techniques he had learned in the United States, together
with a Japanese material-control system and SCM, Dr. Shinto
developed an improved shipbuilding system based on Kaiser's
logic. By 1979, the IHI system enabled a worker to achieve
in one hour the work for which three man-hours were required
in a traditional U.S. shipyard [49].
This same technology, highly refined, is now coming
back to the United States, partly due to the Merchant Marine
Act of 1970. This act contained the authority for the joint
government/industry National Shipbuilding Research Program
(NSRP), whose numerous publications have detailed much of
the modern Japanese methods. Also,- shipyards such as Avon-
dale Industries, Inc. and Bath Iron Works, Inc. have
directly contracted with IHI in the hope of improving the
productivity of their yards.
This section has identified the start of modern ship-
building methods in the United States, how they were trans-
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ferred to Japan and, after significant development, how they
are returning to the United States. It is now appropriate
to consider just what these modern shipbuilding methods are.
2 . 3 Modern Shipbuilding in the United States Today
2.3.1 Introduction
This section contains an overview of ship producibi li ty
and modern shipbuilding methods. Included is a discussion
of group technology; product-oriented work breakdown struc-
tures; planning for production; process flow lanes; zone
construction, outfitting, and painting methods; and accuracy
control . For a much more complete treatment of these topics
the reader is directed to reference 2 of Chapter 1.
2.3.2 Group Technology
Group technology began as an outgrowth of an attempt
to develop a more efficient system of classification and
coding for use in the management of industrial processes.
It is an innovation in the field of management of manufac-
turing processes, not just a technique of keeping track of
material, parts, subassemblies, modules, etc.
The purpose of addressing group technology here is to
better understand shipbuilding and how productivity can be
improved in the shipbuilding industry.
Two definitions of group technology are offered:
1
. ) Group technology is the logical arrangement and
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sequence of all facets of company operation in order to
bring the benefits of mass production to high variety, mixed
quantity production [50]. This definition emphasizes a
systems approach to management and, as such, supports a
central concept, put forth by Mitrofanov, that the group
technology process is a manifestation of the systematization
and generalization of the experience of a manufacturing
industry [51]. The systems approach also emphasizes the
importance of integration of all parts of the company.
2.) Group technology is a technique for manufacturing
small to medium lot size batches of parts of similar pro-
cess, of somewhat dissimilar materials, geometry and size,
which are produced in a committed small cell of machines
which have been grouped together physically, specifically
tooled, and scheduled as a unit [52]. This definition is
worth dissecting, phrase-by-phrase:
* small to medium lot size batches - Group technology
is not applicable to lot sizes which can be efficiently
produced on an assembly line. Rather it is a means of
realizing certain benefits of mass production for essen-
tially similar small batch interim products. It is not mass
production
.
* similar process - This implies categorizing interim
products by problem areas or by the problems common to their
manufacture. These problem areas include the specific type





* somewhat dissimilar materials, geometry, and size -
This means that the same problem area does not imply identi-
cal material, shape, and size. For example, installation of
pipe and air-conditioning ducts may pose the same problems
and therefore be installed by the same crew.
* processed in a committed small cell of machines which
have been grouped together physically - The main idea con-
veyed by this phrase is parallelism. A cell or group within
the shipyard is responsible for completing all aspects of a
given block, unit, or module, regardless of overlapping
functional systems involved. Therefore, subassemblies can
be completed simultaneously, rather than systems being
completed sequentially.
* specifically tooled - This implies that each work
station, including its workers, is specifically equipped for
only the particular job at hand.
* scheduled as a group - This implies beginning work on
a particular unit or subassembly only when all resources for
the job are in hand. This hao important implications for
management, engineering, and material control. In particu-
lar, these functions must be more responsive to production
control than they had been when using traditional system-
oriented shipbuilding methods.
Group technology is not the same thing as classifica-
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tion and coding. However, classification of the elements of
production is perhaps the first step in the successful
implementation of group technology [53]. One classification
system, the product work breakdown structure, is discussed
in the next section.
Classification and coding are often used as if they
were the same thing. They are not and the distinction is
that the code is the vehicle or mechanism by which a clas-
sification system is made usable.
2.3.3 Product-Oriented Work Breakdown Structures
A work breakdown structure is a classification system.
Ones commonly used in shipbuilding are either systems or
product-oriented. The U. S. Navy currently uses a sys-
tems-oriented breakdown called the Expanded Ship Work Break-
down Structure (ESWBS). It is used throughout the entire
ship life cycle and is used in the areas of cost, weight,
specifications, system function and effectiveness, design,
production, and maintenance [54], All major classification
groups are defined by a three-digit code as described in
Table 2.1. The last two groups are used primarily for cost
estimating and progress reporting. Each major group is bro-
ken down into hierarchical subdivisions called subgroups and
elements as shown in Figure 2.4.
A classification scheme to subdivide work in accord-
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400 Command and Surveillance
500 Auxiliary Systems
600 Outfit and Furnishings
700 Armament
800 Integration/Engineering
900 Ship Assembly and Support Services
Table 2.1 The Navy Expanded Ship Work Breakdown Structure
(ESWBS) Major Groups [54]
(Group) 100 - Hull Structure
(Element) 101 - General Arrangement
(Subgroup) 110 - Shell and Supporting Structure
(Element) 111 - Shell Plating
(Element) 112 - Shell Plating, Submarine Non-
Pressure Hull
(Subgroup) 120 - Hull Structural Bulkheads
(Element) 121 - Longitudinal Structural
Bulkheads
(Element) 122 - Transverse Structural
Bulkheads
Figure 2.4 An Example of the ESWBS Organization [54]
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ance with an interim product view is a product-oriented
work breakdown structure ( PWBS ) [55]. Parts and subassem-
blies are grouped by common permanent characteristics, and
classified by both design and manufacturing attributes. The
classification system typically specifies parameters, such
as form, dimensions, tolerances, material, and types and
complexity of production machinery operations. Classifica-
tion by product aspects relates a part or subassembly to a
zone of a ship and also to work processes by problem area
and by work stage. Therefore, product families are deter-
mined by both design and manufacturing attributes.
First, PWBS divides the shipbuilding process into three
basic types of work: hull construction, outfitting, and
painting, because each imposes its own unique set of manu-
facturing problems. These types of work are further subdi-
vided into fabrication and assembly classifications. Within
the painting classification, fabrication applies to the
manufacture of paint, and assembly refers to its applica-
tion. The assembly subdivisions are naturally linked to
zones and are the basis for the zone dominance seen in
shipbuilding management.
Second, PWBS classifies interim products in accordance
with their needs for resources. Resources include material,
manpower, facilities, and expenses.
Third, PWBS classifies interim products by the four
product aspects needed for control of production processes.
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Two product aspects, system and zone, are means for dividing
a ship design into planned and manageable portions. Each
zone is usually addressed by a separate work package. The
other two product aspects, problem area and stage, are means
for dividing the work process from material procurement to
complete ship delivery. These four terms many be defined as
follows
:
* System - a structural function or an operational
function of a product, e. g., longitudinal bulkhead, fire
main system, lighting system, etc.
* Zone - an objective of production which is any geo-
graphical division of the total product, e. g., superstruc-
ture, engine room, etc., and their subdivisions or combina-
tions, e. g. , a structural block or outfit unit, a subas-
sembly of either, and ultimately a part or component.
* Problem area - a division of the production process
into similar types of work problems such as:
- by feature (e. g., curved vs. flat plate, steel vs.
aluminum material, small vs. large diameter pipe)
- by quantity (e. g., job-by- job vs. flow lane)
- by quality (e. g., grade of worker required, grade
of facilities required)
- by kind of work (e. g., marking, cutting, bending,
welding, painting, testing, cleaning)





* Stage - a division of the production process by
sequences, i. e., substeps of fabrication, subassembly,
assembly, erection, and outfitting.
The classification system and categories described
above are illustrated in Figure 2.5.
After an interim product has been identified by its
product aspects, it is necessary to evaluate its efficiency
as a work package. This efficiency is a function of the
time it takes to complete the product, the number of units
of resources, and the quality of the work environment (e.g.,
downhand vs. overhand welding). If the efficiency is not
high enough, the work package must be redefined. This iter-
ative development and evaluation of work packages through
the planning process is illustrated in Figure 2.6.
2.3.4 Planning for Production
In order to successfully include production considera-
tions in preplanning or planning, each shipyard must develop
its own build strategy. This strategy reflects the capabil-
ities, practices, and preferences of the yard, modified to
fit the specifics of the ship to be built. It helps to
define and prioritize decisions about the shipbuilding pro-
ject at its earliest stages. An overview of design and
material definition, the importance of overlap of these
stages with production, and their impact on PWBS will be
treated in this section.
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Figure 2.6 Iterative Development of Work Packages [55]
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Significant overlap of design, material procurement,
and production is essential for reducing the overall con-
struction time, but overlap reduces the time available to
organize information developed by the designers. Therefore,
from the beginning, design information must be formatted to
more fully anticipate needs relating to material and pro-
duction .
In addition to overlap in time, there is an overlap
between functional systems and product aspects. PWBS allows
for this dual grouping. Each phase of the shipbuilding man-
agement cycle (estimating, planning, scheduling, execution,
and evaluation) is addressed in terms of system versus zone
orientation
.
Figure 2.7 indicates the primary emphasis, either sys-
tem or zone, of each of the phases in the shipbuilding pro-
cess. The process begins with a systems orientation. This
is a view of the ship as a whole, broken down by systems.
During preliminary design the key transformation from system
to zone orientation takes place. Later, near the end of the
contract, the transformation back to a system orientation
occurs to permit overall ship evaluation, in terms of both
systems performance and cost performance. The ability to
make these transformations is key to the successful imple-
mentation of group technology-related or PWBS-related ship-
building .












* Basic Design (In Navy parlance this includes all
design through contract design.)
* Functional Design - up to the detail level
* Transition Design - from system to zone
* Work Instruction Detail - down to the worker level
These divisions of the design process are described in Fig-
ure 2.8. The design process continues until each zone is
broken down to components that are to be purchased and to
material requirements for parts that are to be fabricated.
This is the lowest hierarchical level of classification.
The most important point is that each successive stage comes
closer to transforming the developing design into a format
better suited to the end users' needs.
Design as well as production groups are organized
according to classes of problems in such a way as to com-
plement the established zones. Each design group prepares
key drawings, working drawings, and material lists in
accordance with the established zones. Within each group it
is essential to have good "horizontal" communication between
the different engineering disciplines. The group focuses on
composite drawings, which show how the ship is to be built,
and material lists. System arrangement drawings are no
longer needed, as the interference-free and simplified com-
posites, either drawings or scale models, are developed
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Figure 2.8 PWBS Ship Design Process [55]
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group technology apply to design as well as to production.
Zone-oriented scheduling is necessary to control work
flows so that interim products are produced in such a way
as to anticipate only immediate needs. The scheduling must
coordinate all production work and allow time for the tran-
sportation of interim products to the next assembly site.
The goal is to minimize buffer storage while at the same
time creating no bottlenecks or controlling paths. Thus,
integrated schedules are essential for fabrication through
final outfitting and testing.
Shipyards and the Navy desire accurate progress repor-
ting of schedule as well as manpower and material costs.
This is facilitated by having relatively small work pack-
ages. Progress reporting and cost collections are zone-
oriented. This gives both the yard and the Navy accurate
indications of work completed so that work and resources
required for completion can be forecasted. In order for the
Navy (or shipyard) estimators to obtain realistic costs on a
system basis some sort of allocation of costs back to the
system level must be established and agreed upon.
This indirect collection of costs by system may be
viewed as a degradation of system cost data, particularly in
the area of manpower costs. However, the PWBS philosophy
argues that a PWBS-based system produces more accurate data
due to inherently better control. Material usage and costs
can fairly easily be collected by system and cost, particu-
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larly where functional designers are required to identify
all materials for each diagrammatic.
2.3.5 Process Flow Lanes
The process flow lane or process lane concept may be
defined as the "categorization and separation of similar
types of work, and the subsequent development of work cen-
ters specifically designed to efficiently perform that kind
of work" [56]. The keys to effective process flow lanes are
planning, scheduling, and material control. The goal of the
shipyard is to establish process flow lanes which produce
repeatable interim products and which are uniformly loaded,
both for an individual shipbuilding program and for other
shipyard projects as well. Figure 2.9 shows process flow
lanes for a notional shipyard. The process flow lanes are
organized by classes or problem areas and demonstrate how
their end products must integrate for zone-oriented produc-
tion. Fabrication shops and assembly shops are grouped
along the various process flow lanes.
Hull construction has historically been the responsi-
bility of a single shop with a single trade union, so the
introduction of hull block construction in process flow
lanes is fairly easily managed in most American shipyards.
However, the establishment of outfitting process flow lanes
and the integration of the entire ship assembly process cuts
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Figure 2.9 Process Flow Lanes in Modern Shipbuilding [55]
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progress past the modern hull block construction stage has
been slow in most yards. In shipyards that have completely
adopted zone-oriented methods, many trades have been com-
bined in various ways: a ship fitter may do some welding, a
pipe fitter may do some electrical work, etc.
2.3.6 Zone Construction Methods
The product-oriented breakdown of ship construction
accommodates the following zone-oriented methods:
* Hull Block Construction Method (HBCM)
* Zone Outfitting Method ( ZOFM
)
* Zone Painting Method (ZOPM)
Also, since large quantities and varieties of pipe pieces,
ventilation ducting, wire ways, etc. are needed, PWBS
accommodates problem area-oriented family manufacturing
(FM), or pipe piece family manufacturing ( PPFM ) . This is
shown diagrammatically in Figure 2.10. The integration of
HBCM, ZOFM, and ZOPM represents the application of the prin-
ciples of group technology to shipbuilding. Together they
form a total shipbuilding system. PPFM is different in that
it represents the application of group technology to a spe-
cific shop. For more information on PPFM the interested
reader is directed to reference 2 of Chapter 1. HBCM, ZOFM,
and ZOPM will now be discussed briefly.





















Figure 2.10 PWBS Components [56]
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in HBCM . But blocks also directly impact zone outfitting
and painting. As a result, the determinations of block
dimensions and location, compared to other interim products,
have the greatest influence on shipbuilding productivity.
Blocks are designed so that:
* they are assignable to one work package group
* they are inherently stable, balanced structures
* they require minimum working times
* they have maximum accessibility for outfitting and
painting
.
Also, they should be similar in work content as much as
possible so that work can be distributed evenly throughout
the fabrication and assembly levels. Planners and designers
should also try to maximize the amount of downhand welding
and design the blocks to be the largest size capable of
being handled by the shipyard's lifting and moving equip-
ment .
It is usually practical to plan hull construction in
seven levels as shown in Figure 2.11. Work assigned to the
grand block level minimizes the duration required for erec-
tion on the ways. For maximum productivity, the main work
flow path must be level-loaded.
Within each level other than the top two, the interim
products are examined for similarities in their product
aspects. Then they are grouped by these similarities in
order to further modularize the production process, justify
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Figure 2.11 HBCM Manufacturing Levels [57]
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expensive but highly efficient facilities, and achieve man-
power savings. Typical groupings by product aspect are
shown in Figure 2.12. Horizontal combinations characterize
the various types of work packages that are needed for work
to be performed at each level . Vertical combinations of
work packages denote the process flow lanes for hull con-
struction work flow which correspond to the process flow
lanes in Figure 2.9. Maximum productivity is obtained when
work is evenly allocated to work packages grouped by their
product aspects, and there are quick responses to potential
work imbalance, such as shifting workers among manufacturing
levels and/or process flow lanes, authorizing overtime, or
even short-term schedule changes [57].
Since both follow the same logic, ZOFM is a natural
consequence of HBCM. Shipyards which have advanced to the
point of using ZOFM assemble most outfit components indepen-
dent of or on hull blocks.
ZOFM planners must consider the block zones previously
defined for hull construction. Then they are usually other-
wise free to devise zones which best suit their system. So,
while there is generally greater freedom in defining outfit
zones, specifying zone by problem area by stage work pack-
ages affords absolute control of work, even in a confined
area of the ship that contains multiple systems. Outfitting



















































































































































Note : "Nil" indicates no product aspect exists.
Figure 2.12 HBCM Classification by Product Aspects [55]
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nization are sometimes called pallets. Pallets sequenced in
the order they are built make up the ship's outfitting plan.
On-unit outfitting refers to a zone which defines an
arrangement of equipment and supporting structure which is
assembled independent of hull structure. On-block outfit-
ting refers to the assembly of equipment on any structural
subassembly (semi-block, block, or grand block). On-board
outfitting refers to assembly of equipment during or after
hull erection and launching. A zone for on-board outfitting
is usually defined by a compartment, shell, bulkhead, or
deck. In general, on-unit outfitting is the safest and most
efficient, followed by on-block outfitting, and finally on-
board outfitting. Every effort is made to minimize the
amount of on-board outfitting.
Maximum productivity is achieved when work is equally
apportioned to work packages grouped by product aspects at
the most efficient manufacturing levels and uniform and
coordinated work flows are maintained. Other considerations
are shifting work, especially welding, from difficult posi-
tions to downhand positions; selecting and designing com-
ponents so as to maximize on-unit outfitting; transferring
work from difficult or unsafe locations to open, spacious,
low, and otherwise safe places; and planning simultaneous
execution of the maximum number of work packages. These
considerations have led to the practice of planning outfit-






































Figure 2.13 ZOFM Manufacturing Levels [57]
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As in HBCM , interim products with similar product
aspects are grouped to further modularize the production
process, justify expensive but highly efficient facilities,
and achieve manpower savings. Typical groupings by product
aspects are shown in Figure 2.14. It should be noted that
these groupings are for a commercial shipbuilding project.
For a naval combatant the sixth manufacturing level product
aspect area would need to be expanded to include command and
surveillance, and armament. Horizontal combinations charac-
terize types of work packages that are required for work to
be performed at each manufacturing level. Vertical combina-
tions of work package types denote process lanes for outfit-
ting work flow which correspond to the process flow lanes
shown in Figure 2.9. As the use of ZOFM increases, the need
for more balanced planning and scheduling, and cooperation
among hull construction, outfitting, and painting increases.
ZPTM is a natural consequence of HBCM and ZOFM. Much
of the painting work is transferred from the building dock
or outfit pier to preceding manufacturing levels by inte-
grating painting with hull construction and outfitting.
ZPTM manufacturing levels are shown in Figure 2.15. The
prerequisites to successful use of ZPTM are that the paint-
ing interval between one coat and the next coat must be
shorter than the allowable exposure time for the former



































































































Figure 2.15 ZPTM Manufacturing Levels [57]
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to minimize surface preparation and painting rework caused
by further cutting, fitting, and welding, and the shop
primers applied to plates and shapes should not impede cut-
ting and welding. Managers must ensure effective accuracy
control to limit the need for surface preparation and rework
resulting from inaccurately made interim products.
The main objectives of shifting painting to earlier
manufacturing levels are to shift position from overhead to
downhand or vertical, from high places to low places, and
from confined to readily accessible places; facilitate the
use of environment-controlled buildings; provide a safer
setting for painting; prevent in-process rust and subsequent
rework; minimize the use of scaffolding; and facilitate
level-loading work throughout the shipyard. Typical clas-
sification of paint work packages by their product aspects
are shown in Figure 2.16. Horizontal combinations charac-
terize the types of work packages that are required to be
performed at each level. Vertical combinations denote the
process flow lanes for painting work flow.
2.3.7 Accuracy Control
A shipbuilding system based on group technology, using
a PWBS , and integrated hull, outfitting, and painting,
requires good controls on accuracy. An accuracy control
system is initially justified by the need to monitor the
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Figure 2.16 ZPTM Classification by Product Aspects [55]
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work during erection. However, when fully operational,
accuracy control forms a major part of the total shipbuild-
ing system. It involves the regulation of accuracy as a
technique for improving shipbuilding productivity by focus-
ing attention on areas where improvements offer significant
benefits. It also provides the means for monitoring work by
individual work process or problem area. A fully imple-
mented accuracy control system establishes a quantitative
feedback loop between production and planning, design, and
engineering
.
The use of the statistical quality control methods
developed by Deming in the 1940's (see Section 2.2) is an
essential element in an accuracy control system. Accuracy
control should not be confused with quality assurance.
Accuracy control is the regulation of accuracy in order to
achieve maximum productivity. This involves a trade-off
between better accuracy and the downstream improvement in
assembly and erection, and the cost to achieve such accu-
racy [ 5 8 ] .
This chapter has provided background and laid the foun-
dation upon which the rest of this thesis is based. We are
now ready to discuss the ways in which modern ship produc-
tion methods have affected naval ship acquisition practices.
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AND NAVAL SHIP ACQUISITION PRACTICES
3 . 1 Introduction
This chapter considers the consequences of modern ship-
building methods on the naval ship acquisition process as
well as the influence the U. S. Navy has on shipyard prac-
tices. The particular areas considered are design and engi-
neering, CAD/CAM, ship work breakdown structures, and cost
and schedule control systems. It is important to remember
that the information in Section 2.3 was presented from an
idealized and generic point of view, as seen by the
researchers and authors of the various National Ship
Research Program's publications. The information presented
in this chapter will relate how real implementations of
group technology shipbuilding in U. S. shipyards interact
with the U. S. Navy and its ship acquisition process. This
will be accomplished in both a general way as well as in a
specific way by considering examples from actual shipbuild-
ing programs in specific shipyards.
3 . 2 Design and Engineering
Section 2.1 of Chapter 2 discussed ship design and
engineering as viewed by NAVSEA. Section 2.3 of Chapter 2
discussed this topic from the perspective of a group tech-
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nology shipbuilder. Application of group technology prin-
ciples requires alterations in the conventional ship design
and engineering process. This section provides a descrip-
tion of the design and engineering process associated with
group technology shipbuilding, with particular emphasis on
that portion of the process which is under NAVSEA control.
3.2.1 Group Technology Design and Engineering -
General Concepts
The principal output of the design process for a con-
ventional shipbuilder is a set of detailed plans and speci-
fications which are suitable for use by any shipyard. On
the other hand, the outputs for a group technology ship-
builder are unique work instruction packages that provide
specific information for construction organized by the prob-
lem areas defined by an individual shipyard. Also, the mod-
ern process must allow for timely identification of material
and production requirements to enable the shipyard to pro-
cure, plan, and schedule in a manner consistent with its
management and building strategy. Figure 2.7 showed the
management cycle proceeding from system to zone and then back
to a system orientation. Design and engineering follow a
similar pattern. The design stages employed in group tech-
nology shipbuilding were shown in Figure 2.8 and include




In the Navy context, basic design includes the design
iterations up through contract design. This is shown in
Figure 3.1. Significant differences from conventional
design are the elimination of many expensive and time-
consuming system arrangement drawings, identification of
outfit work packages by product aspects on composite draw-
ings, the terminology used, and the organization of design
stages. The four design stages are described as follows:
Basic Design describes a ship as a total system. It is
based on Navy requirements which fix what the ship is to be
and how it is to perform. The end products are specifica-
tions and contract plans which vary greatly in thoroughness
and detail, depending on the program's acquisition strategy.
Functional Design addresses each system in quasi-
arranged diagrammatics for piping and wiring and in system
plans. These diagrammatics are sufficient for Navy approv-
als and are called key plans. A material list by system
(MLS) is prepared for each key plan.
Transition Design regroups information organized by
systems into information organized by zones. This first
interrelationship of systems and zones, drawn on yard plans,
is needed for the development of work instructions.
Work Instruction Design groups design information by
additional product aspects, problem area, and stage, which
are specific to a given shipyard's manufacturing processes.



























A - Functional Design
B - Transition Design
C - Work Instruction Design




ting work instruction. A material list for manufacturing a
pipe piece (MLP) or a material list for manufacturing any
other component ( MLC ) is prepared for each manufacturing
work instruction [1].
In addition to the altered design process and the dif-
ferences between group technology shipbuilding design and
conventional design already described, other major charac-
teristics of group technology design are:
* greater engineering detail is required
* design and engineering must be completed earlier
* material definition must be completed earlier
* greater coordination with production is required
* design and assembly details should be standardized.
Additional information must be provided by engineering and




* tolerances, excess and edge preparation
* coating requirements
* subassembly, unit and block interfaces
* special tools needed for production
* work sites
* structural integrity of subassemblies, units and
blocks, both upright and upside down
* support and pick points for moving and turning sub-
84

assemblies, units and blocks
* minimization of distortion of subassemblies, units
and blocks during turning and moving.
Some of this information may be provided by other shipyard
groups, such as mold loft, planning, or production, but
greater detail and more documentation is required than for
conventional shipbuilding. Overall, the engineering effort
is more intense in a group technology environment.
The Navy's principal influence in ship design and engi-
neering occurs during the basic design stage. It is there-
fore worthwhile to examine this stage in more detail in
order to discern the interactions that do, or should, occur
between the Navy and its shipbuilders early in a shipbuild-
ing program.
Contract plans and specifications are the output of
contract design, which is the last stage of basic design.
These documents provide a general overview of the ship to be
built and, as such, represent the ship in a systems orienta-
tion. Among the documents developed are:
* general arrangements
,




* other specific space arrangements,
* diagrammat ics of major systems,
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* electric one-line diagrams,
* contract specifications.
Also, as part of the feasibility, preliminary, and contract
design processes, normal naval architectural calculations















Development of the building strategy is also considered
during basic design. This involves preliminary determina-
tion of the block plan, the breakdown for outfitting on-
unit, on-block, and on-board, and the preliminary determina-
tion of the outfit pallet list.
In a preliminary way, basic design:
* defines simple, logical block boundaries,
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* defines blocks of maximum size and weight allowed by
the yard's lifting and moving facilities,
* minimizes the number of blocks needed,
* minimizes scaffolding, lifting, and turnovers,
* identifies zone, problem area, and stage classifica-
tions for organizing work flows.
The block pre-def init ion mentioned above considers how to
efficiently fit components and machinery into compartments;
arrange deck machinery, mooring fittings, etc.; and perform
as much painting as possible before hull erection.
Basic design is also concerned with the development of
procurement specifications for long lead time and other
important outfit items. These include main engines, power
generating equipment, electric motors, steering gear,
nuclear propulsion equipment ( in the case of a nuclear-
powered ship), and combat system equipment [2].
3.2.2 Group Technology Design and Engineering -
Examples
We have seen that there is an intensification of the
engineering effort in a group technology environment. Table
3.1 summarizes this effect for the Navy's TAO 187 shipbuild-
ing program. The numbers for conventional construction were
estimated through discussion with Avondale Industries' Ship-
yard Division chief engineer during the TAO 187 program [3],





Total engineering man-hours 520,000
Percent complete at
fabrication start 40
Months from contract to
fabrication start 19






Table 3.1 Engineering Efforts for the TAO 187 [3] [4]
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Figure 3.2 Avondale Industries' Design and Construction
Methods, Conventional vs. Current [5]
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dale's Program Services Division. [4] As can be seen in
this table, the intensity of the engineering effort more
than tripled with the application of group technology meth-
ods. Figure 3.2 further demonstrates this. Of course, the
extra expense involved in this higher intensity effort is
worthwhile only if savings greater than the extra engineer-
ing expense are realized in the course of the production
effort. The shortened production period and earlier deliv-
ery date shown when using Avondale's current methods indi-
cate this was indeed the case for the TAO 187. See Figure
3.2 for details.
Theoretically, most or all of basic design should be
completed prior to contract signing. This poses a problem
for naval ship acquisition managers since the shipbuilder is
not determined until after contract design is completed and
much of the work done during basic design assumes a specific
shipbuilder has already been selected. Attempts were made
to solve this problem in the DDG 51, SSN 21, and TAGOS 19
programs and these will be discussed later.
The machinery arrangement drawings for the TAO 187 were
provided as contract guidance drawings and required modifi-
cations to suit Avondale's construction methods and produ-
cibility improvements. These changes included:
* revisions to suit the main engine purchased in lieu
of the engine assumed in the contract guidance drawings,
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* revisions to built-in tankage to suit system devel-
opments
,
* improved functional grouping of auxiliary systems and
components
,
* development of package unit boundaries to suit ove-
rall arrangements and construction sequence,
* minimizing equipment mounted directly on curved side
shell
,
* integration of ventilation and wireway routings into
space arrangements,
* integration of access and handling of main engine
special tools and spares into space arrangements,
* detailed development of systems to enable racking of
pipe runs, grouped deck and bulkhead penetrations, etc. [6],
Consideration of accessibility for operation and main-
tenance of all components throughout the ship's life was a
primary objective throughout the design process. This con-
sideration was consistent with basic shipyard producibility
considerations in that the greater the ease of accessibility
in the ship the greater the shipyard productivity.
Table 3.2 summarizes the results of various producibil-
ity and productivity measures undertaken in the machinery
spaces of the TAO 187. It should be noted that some weight
impacts are positive and some are negative. Although no
proof was offered, it is Avondale's position that the sum of




Weight 15% increase in
foundation weight





Construction Cost 15% - 20% reduction
Construction Schedule Machinery Space Equip-
ment and System
Installation not on
the critical path of
ship construction




When most or all of the drawings in the Navy's contract
design package are provided for "guidance only" , the con-
tractor has the maximum latitude for developing the detailed
design that best accommodates his build strategy and ship-
yard capabilities. However, there is a growing trend for
the Navy to make drawings in the contract design package
contract documents. This was true in the LSD 44 program and
is now true in the AOE 6 program. Such drawings, which have
not had the benefit of producibili ty considerations, will
result in higher ship construction costs, and possible oper-
ational limitations and contractual disputes.
In some programs the Navy has tried to come to grips
with this problem. These programs include the DDG 51, SSN
21, TAGOS 19, and LSD 44 (Cargo Variant) programs. For the
SSN 21 basic design phase there were only two qualified
shipyards and both participated heavily in preliminary and
contract design. For the LSD 44 (Cargo Variant) program,
NAVSEA awarded a contract for contract design to Avondale
Industries. Producibility , at least from Avondale's per-
spective, was thus assured to some degree. But since this
is basically a modified repeat design, there are still many
of the original contract drawing problems. Also, Avondale's
final design product had to be sufficiently general to
ensure other shipyards could bid on the detail design and
construction contract on a competitive basis with Avondale.
In the DDG 51 program, a great deal of industry input
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was requested prior to and during contract design. The var-
ious contractors were compensated for their efforts, but
only at a minimal level. Most spent far more than they were
paid for their efforts, considering it a calculated business
investment. In the end, one contract design package was
developed and it incorporated many producibili ty ideas, but
due to the competitive nature of the following detail design
and construction contract, no one shipyard's proposals could
be exclusively followed in the producibility area. Also in
spite of the open and generally productive atmosphere the
DDG 51 contract design was conducted in, it is probable that
some shipyards kept some of their best producibility ideas
to themselves and would have incorporated them into the
design only after winning the detail design and construction
contract
.
In the DDG 51 program two of the main basic design par-
ticipants, Bath Iron Works and Ingalls Shipbuilding Division
of Litton Industries, won the lead and follow yard con-
tracts, respectively. In the TAGOS 19 program, the basic
design was carried out in a manner similar to the DDG 51 's.
However, none of the seventeen initial participants in the
basic design process won the competition for the detail
design and construction of the first ship. This situation
will certainly not encourage shipbuilders to use their best
talent to assist in similar basic designs in the future,





3.2.3 Group Technology Design and Standardization
Standardization is the principle of design for produc-
tion that could theoretically lead to the greatest improve-
ments in productivity [8]. The discussion of group tech-
nology and PWBSs has emphasized the concept of organization
of work by problem area. The ultimate goal is to develop a
group of standard building blocks that can be combined to
produce very different final products.
Efforts at standardization are usually concentrated at
the component, subassembly, block, and outfit unit levels.
Standards may be classified in two groups [9]. These are
basic standards and standard drawings. Basic standards
include material and component standards, outfitting stan-
dards, design standards, production engineering standards,
and inspection standards. Standard drawings show typical
subassemblies and outfit units that may be used directly on
new designs or as guidance in preparing new drawings. Fig-
ure 3.3 organizes this classification of standards in more
detail
.
Figures 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7 are simplified examples
of standard drawings for a structural subassembly, machinery
arrangement, piping layout, and outfit unit, respectively.
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Figure 3.5 Standard Machinery Arrangement Module [8]
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Figure 3.7 Standard Outfit Unit Module [8]
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commercial ship design and construction than in naval ship
programs. Over the years numerous Military Specifications
(MILSPECs) and Military Standards (MILSTDs) have been devel-
oped and routinely invoked in shipbuilding contracts. At
the time each was developed it responded to some real or
perceived need which resulted from a battle casualty, equip-
ment failure, personnel casualty, or similar problem.
Unfortunately, over the years not much effort has gone into
reviewing these MILSPECs and MILSTDs for current usefulness
and they have proliferated to the point where the whole sys-
tem has become unmanageable and to some extent, outdated.
There are numerous examples of MILSPECs which are still in
effect simply because they proved useful decades ago. Few
attempts have been made to update them after new materials,
technologies, or processes became available.
If, for example, a shipbuilder wished to use some new
structural detail or welding process which would enhance
producibility and reduce construction costs, the shipbuilder
would typically bear the responsibility, risk, and cost for
shock qualifying or otherwise obtaining approval of the new
detail or process. And then, even if this is done, the
approval is typically restricted to the class or type of
ship for which the approval was originally requested. In
such an environment, where contractors have little incentive
to improve the system, it is not surprising that attempts at
achieving standardization are few [10].
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3.2.4 Design Changes in a Group Technology
Engineering Environment
Design changes in naval ship acquisition programs are
very common. In fact, to deal with the large volume of
changes frequently encountered in a major combatant program,
the Navy has developed an extensive system which is more or
less standardized across various shipbuilding programs.
Design changes occur for a variety of reasons and
can be broadly broken down into two categories: changes that
occur due to Navy actions and changes that occur due to
contractor actions. These include:
* Navy
- correction of errors discovered in specifications
or contract drawings
- correction on follow ships of problems uncovered dur-
ing operation of the first ship of a class
- the desire to continually incorporate the latest
technology in combat systems and other ship systems
- different thinking and new preferences that develop
over time
- application of new rules and regulations
- new interpretations of existing rules and regula-
tions





- revised fitting stages
- revised equipment or component locations
- revised manufacturing process
- revised material availability or sources
- revision of hull structure
- resolution of a design reservation.
A number of contractor changes are the inevitable result of
the calculated risk of allowing each of the outfit design
groups to simultaneously conduct functional, transition, and
work instruction design. Certain aspects of the design
progress conditionally, pending the resolution of interfer-
ence problems.
There is no doubt that group technology ship design and
construction is a much more change-intolerant environment
than conventional shipbuilding was. This is an anticipated
and natural consequence of a system that requires much more
documentation and, at the work instruction level, much more
paperwork in order to construct a ship. Also, the timing
and intensity of the engineering effort tend to make design
changes more expensive and have a greater impact on the
total effort. This greater expense and impact on the ship-
building program is justified only if the downstream savings
in ship construction costs and shorter construction sched-




In the TAO 187 program a special effort was made to
hold the number of contract changes to a minimum. Items that
were "nice to have" but not essential were not considered.
Also, since the TAO 187 is an auxiliary ship and not a com-
batant, there is less of a concern with achieving the state-
of-the-art. There is also traditionally less Navy oversight
of auxiliary ship programs and so there are fewer possible
inputs for changes. To accommodate the few changes that did
occur (in the neighborhood of 100 [11]) a streamlined change
control process was instituted. This mainly involved the
NAVSEA program office giving more authority to the local
Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair office
for negotiating contract changes. As a result, the impact
of changes on the TAO 187 program was minimal and the first
four ships of this class were delivered on schedule and at
or under budget. This was true even though Avondale Indus-
tries has possibly the most advanced implementation of group
technology shipbuilding in the U. S. and is therefore pre-
sumably the most change-intolerant.
In the CG 47 and DDG 51 Aegis shipbuilding programs the
impact of changes has been much more severe. The CG 47
program has had literally tens of thousands of changes to
date. The large number was mainly due to the parallel
design efforts involved in the shipbuilding program and the
Aegis combat system development. Since the combat system
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was planned for installation in an existing hull ( DD 963
design), the number of changes was actually less than other-
wise might have been expected. The effects of these changes
on the contractors' shipbuilding systems were mitigated by
the fact that neither Aegis shipbuilder had a fully devel-
oped group technology-related system at the start of the
Aegis shipbuilding program.
The same conditions do not exist in the DDG 51 program.
This program features a new hull design coupled with the
existing, but still very much developing, Aegis combat sys-
tem. The number of contract changes are expected to rival
that of the CG 47 program. To study the potential impact of
these changes, a study was made of representative changes in
the CG 47 and DDG 51 programs at both Bath Iron Works (BIW)
and Ingalls Shipbuilding (IS). The purpose of the study was
to obtain some measure of the engineering impact of changes
in a group technology environment.
BIW claims to have essentially a fully implemented
group technology shipbuilding system for the DDG 51 program,
while IS's system is not so fully developed. The changes
selected for evaluation were from among those that were
essentially the same for both the CG 47 and DDG 51 programs
from a production and ship impact standpoint. This allowed
for the comparison of engineering man-hours between the same
changes in the two yards to be used as a valid basis for





The changes considered were:
* addition of a light to the Officer of the Deck's
(OOD's) stand on the bridge
* increasing power of the weapons pallet truck by
changing the power supply voltage from 12 to 24 volts
* replacing the existing rudder stock seal with a new
type of seal to prevent leakage problems
* changing the control system for the ship's vertical
package conveyor system
* permanent installation of a strain gage shaft align-
ment system
* changing the gasket material in some fuel oil and
lube oil piping [12].
Table 3.3 gives an indication of the engineering impact of
these changes in a group technology engineering environment
No multi-system, single zone change was found. Such a
change could be the addition of a damage control locker to
the ship. One zone might be affected but numerous piping
and electrical systems would need do be rerouted to make
room for the space.
A multi-system, multi-zone change will generally have
the greatest impact on the engineering effort in terms of
man-hours required to process the change in a group tech-
nology engineering environment. For this reason the gasket































Table 3.3 Engineering Impact of Selected Changes in the
CG 47 and DDG 51 Shipbuilding Programs [12]
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be remembered that this analysis applies to only the engi-
neering portion of the change.
In April of 1985, NAVSEA directed the replacement of
asbestos-filled spiral-wound gaskets with non-asbestos spi-
ral-wound paper/chlorite AMFU gaskets for raised-flange
applications [13]. Unfortunately, these gaskets leaked when
used in fuel and lube oil systems. Eventually, after par-
tial testing, a decision was made to use non-asbestos spi-
ral-wound graphite-filled gaskets. It is interesting to
note that test results did not conclusively confirm that the
graphite-filled gaskets will solve the leakage problems and
another solution may need to be found in the future.
From a material standpoint this change simply involves
substituting one type of gasket for another. The number of
gaskets totaled 1415, of 57 different types, ranging in size
from 1/4 inch to 10 inches. From a production standpoint,
the installation of these gaskets may prove more difficult
than for the asbestos-filled ones. This is because a higher
quality flange face finish, truer pipe alignment, and
greater torque are required to ensure leak-free operation.
Generally, these material and production aspects are of
equal consequence to both yards. However, the engineering
effort, in terms of man-hours required to implement this
change, varies considerably from BIW to IS.
Table 3.4 gives a breakdown of the engineering-related































Notes : "Drawings" includes actual drawings,
BIW engineering standards, and other
engineering documents.
CAD documents and files includes CAD
system changes, computer data set models,
and material lists.
Table 3.4 Engineering-related Man-hours for the DDG 51
Spiral-wound Gasket Filler Material Change [12]
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lar breakdown was not available for IS but the total number
of engineering-related man-hours required to implement this
change was approximately 10% of the total shown in Table
3.4. This large difference for essentially the same engi-
neering change is mostly attributable to BIW's CAD implemen-
tation and the expense of altering and reissuing numerous
documents at the detail work instruction level. Similar
differences for other changes are common in the Aegis pro-
gram and account for the skeptical attitude toward group
technology shipbuilding exhibited by some Aegis program per-
sonnel. It is the opinion of the Technical Director for the
DDG 51 shipbuilding program that more conventional ship
design methods should be used for major combatants, at least
for the first few ships of the class. Then, after most
changes have been processed, a more economical transition to
the work instruction level of detail could be accomplished.
While this approach might reduce the cost of the engi-
neering portion of changes and make them easier to accept
politically, it might also have the effect of increasing
ship production costs. The cost of engineering changes must
be evaluated in the context of the entire shipbuilding pro-
gram .
3.2.5 Group Technology Design Products
It has been mentioned previously that with the advent
of group technology design and engineering, shipbuilders
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have been freed from the need to develop individual detail
system arrangement drawings. This has caused great concern
among some sectors of the NAVSEA ship design community [14].
Traditionally, detail system arrangement drawings have been
used for planning future ship alteration (SHIPALT) and over-
haul work packages. With these drawings no longer developed
by the shipbuilder, some systems engineers believe they will
not have the resources required for adequate SHIPALT and
overhaul planning. However, the information typically con-
tained in detail system arrangement drawings can be found in
detail zone arrangement drawings. In addition, other infor-
mation not generally found on detail system arrangement
drawings, such as system interferences, is available. As a
result, detail zone arrangement drawings may prove to be
more useful as planning documents than detail system arran-
gement drawings. The biggest problem will be overcoming the
institutional mindset that believes detail system arrange-
ment drawings are necessary [15].
Another problem is concerned with the format of zone
drawings. At this time each shipbuilder has his own method
of developing them. Typically the drawings include redun-
dant information with both the Navy's and the contractor's
nomenclature included. And in some cases, too many systems
are included on one sheet of the same drawing. All of this
results in cluttered and difficult to read drawings. In
order to alleviate these problems the Navy needs to develop
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a standardized zone drawing format and invoke it in ship-
building contracts, as MILSTD 100 and MILSTD 1000 are now
invoked [ 16] { 17]
.
3.3 CAD/CAM
Computers were initially used in the shipbuilding
industry as accounting tools. Their application has
expanded dramatically over the years and the many current
uses of the computer in shipyards has expanded beyond the
capability implied by the term CAD/CAM. A list of modern
computer-aided functions could include:
* computer-aided design (CAD)
* computer-aided drafting
* computer-aided engineering ( CAE
)
* computer-aided manufacturing (CAM)
* computer-aided material definition
* computer-aided process planning ( CAPP )
.
Other than the above items, computer applications in ship-












As a result, the term CAD/CAM may be somewhat misleading. A
more descriptive term is computer-integrated manufacturing
(CIM). The major problem now facing shipbuilders in the
application of CIM is the lack of a unified shipbuilding
data base that provides the capability of interfacing with
all the applications mentioned above [18]. The relationship
of the data base to the design cycle and its outputs is
shown in Figure 3.8. Information required in the data base
includes
:
* numerical and geometrical data on past designs
* weight and space scaling relationships
* systems and equipment
* structural design data
* resistance and propulsion data
* cost data
* typical block plans
* typical outfit plans
* shipyard and military standards and specifications
* material lists.
Implementation of a CIM system permits the evaluation
of additional design options as well as consideration of
alternate building strategies. Computer-generated plans,
lists, and work instructions may be used for the various
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Figure 3.8 The Relationship of a Shipbuilding Data
Base to the Ship Design Process [19]
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The ultimate goal of a CIM system is improvement in
shipbuilding productivity. Among the manifestations of
increased productivity are:
* the ability to produce concept and feasibility ship
design studies more quickly and accurately
* the ability to rapidly evaluate design options and
choose the optimum one
* the ability to perform design calculations with
greater confidence due to having a proven data base
* the ability to transfer data in digital form to ship-
yard design offices and manufacturing facilities
* the ability to establish and use shipyard standards.
A coordinated system should lead to simplification of all
aspects of the design and production process. See Figure
3.9 for a descriptive summary.
A recent attempt to improve the state-of-the-art in
CAD/CAM implementation has taken place in the SSN 21 pro-
gram. NAVSEA, together with the Electric Boat Division of
General Dynamics, Inc. and Newport-News Shipbuilding and
Drydock , Inc. have implemented the National Bureau of Stan-
dards Initial Graphics Interchange Specification ( IGES ) on
the detail design of the submarine. This allows the two
shipyards, with their different and normally incompatible
brands of CAD/CAM equipment, to exchange all forms of digi-
tal data between their two design departments.
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Figure 3.9 Advanced Integrated CAD/CAM Network [19
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As mentioned earlier, a fully developed CIM system
requires the development of a unified shipbuilding data
base. Part of this development involves the preparation of
a "standard library" which contains a considerable level of
information covering standard outfit items. This library
requires many man-hours and is a task unto itself, necessi-
tating verification prior to using it to prepare interferen-
ce-free working drawings. Experience has shown that, while
optimistic forecasts of advanced CAD/CAM installations have
eventually been successful, they have not very often been
put into service within their required schedule [20]. Such a
realization caused the project team for the Service Life
Extension Program for the USS Kitty Hawk ( CV 63) to modify
its original plans for use of group technology on the pro-
gram [ 21 ] .
CAD/CAM projects currently being pursued within the
Navy generally fall under the cognizance of the DoD program
known as Computer Aided Logistic Support ( CALS ) . CALS was
initiated in 1985 by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in an
effort to achieve major improvements in weapon system
designs, and to improve the accuracy, timeliness, and use of
logistic technical information. The ultimate goal is to
move from current paper- intensive weapon system support pro-
cesses to a largely automated and integrated system [22].




NAVSEA has identified two intermediate goals in support
of CALS. They are:
* identify and specify the digital products that are to
be received at the conclusion of each ship acquisition and
support phase and
* have the facilities and software in place to receive
those digital products and use them as the basis for all
support activities [23].
The principal technical problem to be solved is finding
a way for computer communication links to be made among the
varied and numerous participants. Figure 3.11 shows a flow
chart of the CALS process. The lettered arrows are the
communications links. A joint industry/Navy committee has
been formed to research this problem. It is called The
Navy/Industry Digital Data Exchange Steering Committee.
Demonstration data transfer projects are currently underway
in the DDG 51 program and, as already mentioned, in the SSN
21 program. These programs have been mainly concerned with














































































3 . 4 Work Breakdown Structures ( WBS ) and Cost and
Schedule Control Systems (C/SCS)
Navy shipbuilding contracts routinely call for WBSs
and require that they conform with MILSTD 881A, which is
entitled "Work Breakdown Structures for Defense Material
Items". In addition, shipbuilding contracts frequently
require adherence to further Navy-defined WBSs. Two that
are currently invoked are called the ship work breakdown
structure ( SWBS ) and the expanded ship work breakdown
structure (ESWBS). ESWBS was briefly described in Section
2.3.3. Their most important feature is that both are organ-
ized along functional or ship system lines.
The WBS that makes the most sense for group technology-
oriented shipbuilders, however, is a product oriented work
breakdown structure ( PWBS ) . This was described in detail in
Section 2.3.3. Further, Chapter 32, Part 196 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, entitled "Work Breakdown Structures for
Defense Material Items", requires that government contrac-
tors have complete flexibility in extending the generic WBSs
described in MILSTD 881A (see Appendix A) to reflect how the
contractor's work is to be accomplished. This has led some
people, both shipbuilder and Navy personnel, to contend that
the Navy-imposed SWBS and ESWBS are therefore, at best,
unneeded documents, and are, at worst, illegal documents
[24] .
If this conflict between Navy requirements for a tra-
ditional system-oriented WBS and contractor requirements for
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a product-oriented WBS , which reflects the way the ship is
actually constructed and managed, is not resolved, ship-
builders will continue to manage by one system and report to
the Navy by another. The inefficiencies and inaccuracies
that result are not only expensive but also lead to the Navy
not being able to adequately monitor cost and schedule
progress
.
The Navy's SWBS was originally issued in March 1973 as
a structured system (3-digit numbers providing 5 levels of
breakdown) which was intended for use in specification pre-
paration, cost estimating, cost progressing, management,
weight control, drawing numbering, shipyard job order cod-
ing, and similar purposes. ESWBS provides two additional
levels of breakdown of functional systems so that ESWBS can
be used for logistic support, maintenance, and life cycle
support purposes. ESWBS is now being specified contractu-
ally and is used as the basis for C/SCS reporting. Appendix
B provides more details.
As described in Section 2.3.3, the PWBS was developed
to support group technology shipbuilding. As such, it pro-
vides a natural breakdown for schedule reporting and for
collection of financial data as required by C/SCS instruc-
tions. A shipbuilder's PWBS is hardware or product-
oriented, and is consistent with the methods of planning,
scheduling, and construction actually being used by the
119

shipbuilder. Appendix C provides further details.
Effective management control must be based on the items
or products produced. The PWBS used on a particular ship-
building program should be based on the products produced
and on the coding system used within the shipbuilder's man-
agement structure. For example, on the LSD 44 program at
Avondale Industries, Inc., ships are fabricated by assemb-
ling units which are numbered from 000 to 799. The units'
locations are usually determined by the digit in the
hundred's column. Material is scheduled and assembled by
unit number and work is budgeted and authorized by units or
groups of units. The unit number is the focal point of the
PWBS and units are easily summarized by series: 100, 200,
etc., for reporting purposes. Where there is a process or
effort which spans unit boundaries, the definition of MILSTD
881A are used to define these efforts and are summarized at
the series level for reporting. Other activities such as
testing, program management, or other services are similarly
summarized to coincide with MILSTD 881A definitions at lev-
els 2 and 3. All of the reporting is developed and used to
manage, control, and report financial status directly from
the labor and material coding used in Avondale 's accounting
system. If reporting was done based on an ESWBS system, the
information would somehow have to be back-allocated into the
traditional functional or system categories. This would be
needlessly time-consuming and probably inaccurate for both
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schedule and cost reporting. Figure 3.12 depicts the physi-
cal ship elements of the LSD 44 program contract WBS and
Table 3.5 describes all summary elements. Figure 3.13 is a
portion of the program's responsibility assignment matrix
(RAM). The element numbers in the matrix indicate summary
work package numbers. A review of the RAM quickly discloses
which work group (with the name of the corresponding work
group superintendent) is responsible for its portion of the
work in a particular zone or within a particular element.
The initial steps to resolve the conflicts between
shipbuilder and Navy desires regarding WBSs have been taken
[27]. At an industry conference on WBSs attended by repre-
sentatives of various shipbuilders, NAVSEA, ASN(S&L), and
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), a decision was
made for the industry conferees to submit their requested
revisions of MILSTD 881A to the Navy and OSD for review. An
ad hoc industry committee was formed and prepared a proposal
which was submitted to representatives of OSD, ASN(S&L), and
NAVSEA at a follow-up meeting on September 24, 1987 [28].
The recommendations were well-received by the government
attendees and a formal response to the industry position was
promised by October 28, 1987. Unfortunately, the Navy has
been unable to obtain the approval of the other services for
the proposed changes to the MILSTD. This stems from the



































































Contract WBS Element Description
or Zone
000 Includes units which are special
fabrications installed through-
out the ship. Work under this
element includes material , man-
power, inspection test, super-




100 Includes units between frames
43 and 98 and baseline to the
02 level.
200 Includes units between frames
98 and 137 and baseline to the
main deck level
.
300 Includes units between frames
13.2 and 43 and baseline to the
02 level.
400 Includes units between frames
13.2 and 92 and above 02 level.
500 Includes units between frames
92 and the stern and above the
main deck.
600 Includes units between frames
137 and the stern and from
baseline to the main deck.
700 Includes units between the stem
and frame 13.2 and from base-
line to the main deck.
Ship Assembly Includes efforts and material
associated with the ship as a
whole and which cannot be
identified with other zones.
Table 3.5 Description of Contract WBS Elements for
the LSD 44 Shipbuilding Program [25]
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Contract WBS Element Description
or Zone
Integration/ Includes labor and material for
Engineering the design of the ship.
Program Management Includes efforts and material
to provide management necessary
to ensure cost, schedule, and
technical performance under the
contract
.
Test and Evaluation Includes efforts and material
to conduct all testing for the
ship
.
Data Includes all deliverable data
to be submitted, as listed on
contract data requirements
list
Spares, Support, Includes efforts and material
Jigs, and Dies necessary to procure, handle,
and store spare components,




Table 3.5 Description of Contract WBS Elements for
























for transitions from a system to a zone and then back to a
system orientation. Even within the Navy there is opposi-
tion to this process because of fear that every shipbuilder
would try to avail itself of a unique cost performance
reporting system. It appears at this time that the use of
MILSTD 881A as the vehicle to establish the so-called "two
track" reporting system may not be feasible. Nevertheless,
ASN(S&L) and NAVSEA appear committed to finding a way to
facilitate the use of a PWBS . NAVSEA is preparing an
internal decision paper on the issue and it is expected in
the very near future.
3 . 5 Learning Curve Effects in Group Technology
Shipbuilding
It is widely believed that the group technology
approach to shipbuilding is worthwhile for even one-of-kind
ships. And, of course, as more ships of the same class are
built, further savings accrue due to decreased production
costs. But does the data indicate these savings are con-
stant or is there any evidence that savings continue to
increase as the number of ships produced increases? In
other words, does any "learning" take place? To help answer
this question, the TAO 187 shipbuilding program at Avondale
Industries, Inc. was considered. Table 3.6 shows the
results of examining the cost data summary reports prepared
for the TAO 187, 188, 189, and 190. It is clear that some
slight benefit arises from series production. As was noted
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Note : Data are reported on a relative basis with
the recurring costs for the TAO 187 set
arbitrarily to 1.000. This was done due to
the proprietary nature of the cost data.
Table 3.6 Recurring Ship Production Costs for the
TAO 187 Program [29]
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earlier, few changes were made during the course of this
shipbuilding program. This is the only military shipbuild-
ing contract that has been completed and has used the group
technology approach from beginning to end. (More TAOs are
being built under new contracts.) It will be interesting in
to analyze the return costs for other shipbuilding programs
at other shipyards in the future to see if there is evidence
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4 . 1 Conclusions
As was noted in Section 2.1.6, the strategies used in
today's naval ship acquisition programs are decided on a
case-by-case basis at the beginning of each acquisition pro-
gram. The approach taken is articulated in the program's
acquisition plan. The technical and managerial complexities
associated with the design and construction of modern naval
ships make such an approach preferable to the rigid
approaches used in the past. This is particularly true
today since the building capabilities of potential ship-
builders must be taken into account at the beginning of the
program if the Navy is to obtain the best ship for the
stated mission in the shortest period of time at the least
cost
.
The group technology-based design and construction
methods employed today by successful U. S. shipbuilders have
significant effects on the manner in which NAVSEA approaches
its primary task of ship acquisition. It has been argued
that in today's technical environment NAVSEA must be aware
of the specific capabilities of all of its potential ship-
builders if it is to obtain the best ships for the tax-
payers' money. And in today's political and economic envi-
ronment, with the Navy entering what will undoubtedly be a
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period of prolonged budget shortfalls in its shipbuilding
program, it is essential that the Navy make every effort to
obtain the most "bang for the buck" . By encouraging and
supporting modern group technology shipbuilding and promot-
ing attention to produci bi li ty among its shipbuilders, the
Navy will be the ultimate recipient of the benefits which
accrue
.
Recent design efforts have included attempts to ensure
that producibility is given a high priority. The AOE 6 pro-
gram held several design reviews with prospective shipbuild-
ers to identify producibility improvements in the design.
The DDG 51 design had a group of shipbuilders review the
design and perform separate studies to evaluate various pro-
ducibility concepts. The SWATH TAGOS program collocated a
diverse group of shipbuilders with the NAVSEA design team
and used their suggestions to improve the producibility of
the design. The SSN 21 program took steps to ensure that
both submarine shipbuilders in this country addressed produ-
cibility in their design efforts. All of these efforts
have heightened the sensitivity of NAVSEA's designers and
the Navy's shipbuilders to designing naval ships with produ-
cibility in mind. As indicated earlier, the benefactor of
these efforts is the Navy. It has received better ships for
fewer dollars in a shorter period of time. It is therefore
in the Navy's best interests to do even more to ensure that
producibility and the other attendant benefits of group
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technology shipbuilding are realized in the future. Spe-
cific areas in which the Navy should concentrate its efforts
are now suggested.
4 . 2 Recommendations
As has been discussed, significant advances have been
made in implementing group technology methods in naval
shipbuilding and in improving the producibility of Navy
ships. However, there are specific areas in the naval ship
acquisition process where further improvements can be made.
These changes and improvements should help to further
increase productivity and reduce ship construction times and
costs
.
In the areas of CAD/CAM, WBSs, and C/SCSs , specific
recommendations are:
* The Computer Aided Logistics Support program deserves
strong support from the highest levels in DoD and the Navy.
It has great potential for very large cost savings for the
Navy.
* The joint Navy/Industry Digital Data Exchange Steer-
ing Committee should be encouraged and their efforts
expanded
.
* Efforts to include public shipyards and shipyard





* The Navy needs to find a way to facilitate the use of
product work breakdown structures among all its shipbuild-
ers. It might be as simple as changing the Cost Performance
Reporting Handbook issued by NAVSEA and ensuring that con-
tract requirements are revised to reflect the new systems.
If this is not done the Navy will continue to impose need-
less extra work on its shipbuilders and receive cost and
schedule data of doubtful quality and usefulness.
As was pointed out in Section 2.2, the genesis for much
of the current progress in naval ship producibili ty and
group technology shipbuilding was the National Ship Research
Program (NSRP). This program can continue to save the Navy
money in three ways. One is to continue on the present
course of solving productivity and producibili ty problems in
new ship construction. The second is to use some of the
NSRP initiatives and methodologies in ship repair, overhaul,
and modernization. In the years to come new construction
will decline and the importance of maintaining and moderni-
zing ships economically will increase. The third area to
reap additional savings is in applying NSRP initiatives and
methodologies to the Navy's vendor community. Emphasis in
the past has been on applying producibil ity concepts to the
prime contractor in a shipbuilding program, namely, the
shipbuilder. It is important to remember, though, that
today the cost of a modern warship system is divided almost
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equally between the ship itself and its combat system and
other government furnished equipment. Applying group tech-
nology to the vendor community should therefore be worth-
while and should be pursued.
In the Navy's attempts to find ways to save money in
the next few years, much attention will be given to justify-
ing current research and development programs. The NSRP is
a program which has paid and continues to pay for itself
many times over. What it lacks, though, is a program cham-
pion to save it from the budgeteer's ax. It is in the best
interests of the Navy and the NSRP to correct this defi-
ciency immediately and for the Navy to continue to support
the NSRP.
The greatest productivity and producibility gains of
the future may come in the area of combatant ship design.
This is because this area has historically been the most
constrained due to issues of ship safety, survivability, and
maintainability. Design practice changes will be driven by
the severe cost constraints placed on today's naval ships
and by the involvement of shipbuilders in the design pro-
cess. This involvement has heightened NAVSEA ship design-
ers' sensitivity to the benefits of producibility. NAVSEA
must provide designs which enable the application of ship-
yard producibility expertise.
The conventional wisdom has been that since ship con-
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struction facilities and methods vary widely among ship-
yards, the Navy cannot tailor a contract design for a spe-
cific shipbuilder. Perhaps this indicates that the Navy
should get out of the contract design business. It might be
more advantageous for the Navy to award contract design con-
tracts to all shipbuilders interested in a specific program.
Each shipbuilder could then maximize the producibili ty meth-
ods used in its own shipyard and provide the Navy with a
contract design which is most economical for it to produce.
Such an environment requires that the Navy minimize the num-
ber of contract drawings and maximize the amount of informa-
tion given for guidance only. The increased costs incurred
from multiple contract design efforts should be more than
offset by the decrease in production costs realized from
allowing the winning shipyard to maximize the use of its
producibility methods.
It is recognized that this approach may be too radical
for the Navy bureaucracy, and in particular for NAVSEA, to
accept. Other approaches may be more acceptable. There are
many potential early stage design producibility concepts
which could be beneficially applied by all modern shipbuild-
ers and these are now suggested.
Contract guidance drawings that identify functionally
related package units could be developed as part of the pre-
liminary design process. Basic entities such as fuel oil
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pump and heater packages, lube oil filter and cooler pack-
ages, auxiliary sea water pump packages, main engine jacket
water pump and cooler packages, modularized berthing com-
partments, etc. are certainly identifiable at early stages
of design and, regardless of the shipbuilder selected, the
most cost effective and operationally viable arrangement of
these packages or systems could be obtained.
Other general concepts have been identified and form a
core group of opportunities for enhancing producibi 1 i ty
.
They should be evaluated in specific designs where they are
applicable. They include:
* Hull Form:
- use of parallel midbodies and flat bottoms
- maximum use of flat plates
- minimal use of compound curves
- minimal use of combined shear and camber
- use of flat, rather than curved, transoms.
* Structures (Most suggestions in this area would
require significant changes to MILSPECs and MILSTDs, as
alluded to in Section 3.2.3):
- maximum use of uniform plate sizes
- use of flat bars or angles as stiffeners
- use of lapped or bracketed end connections for
stiffeners
- maximum use of uniform stiffener sizes
- use of flat innerbottoms
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- running deck longitudinals parallel to the ship
centerline at the bow and stern.
* Arrangements:
- grouping functionally related compartments together
- as describe earlier, arranging equipment to aid in
the preoutf i tting of package units.
* Machinery:
- increasing commonalty of equipment (standardiza-
tion )
runs
- centralizing parts of a system to minimize piping
- using commercial equipment where acceptable




- using modular systems
- distributing combat system support services verti-
cally using armored trunks.
In order for NAVSEA designers to consider and evaluate
producibility concepts, there are certain actions NAVSEA
should take. These include:
* training ship design engineers in modern ship con-
struction practices and producibility concepts (It should
be mentioned here that the Education and Training Panel of
the Ship Production Committee of SNAME is now in the process
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of developing a certificate course in manufacturing engi-
neering and ship production.
)
* developing evaluation methodologies and cost estima-
ting relationships to allow evaluation of producibility
concepts during early stage design (The lack of non-
proprietary numerical data will make this task difficult
and poses a separate problem in itself.)
* considering changes to the ship design process which
will facilitate design for modular construction during early
design stages
* developing standard design practices to include pro-
ducibility in ship designs
* developing a lessons learned mechanism that provides
feedback or communication with shipbuilders and researchers
in the ship producibility area.
It must be kept in mind that design for producibility
is only one of many design considerations. Adoption of
alternatives for enhanced producibility must be based on
analyses of their impacts on other design considerations and
life cycle costs. To do this will require knowledge of cost
factors and modern ship production technology. For example,
it has been suggested that selection of slightly larger
ships, which are more producible, is preferable to selection
of more costly and less producible, but more compact, ships.
This argument implies that heavier systems for machinery or
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structure are likely to be chosen in favor of lighter, but
less producible, ones. When this situation is evaluated
with regard to increased life cycle costs incurred due to
propelling a larger, heavier ship through the water for sev-
eral decades, the ultimate decision might be to use the less
producible design. Therefore, producibil ity concepts which
significantly affect ship performance (the heavier ship will
also be slower), or which significantly affect other design
considerations or life cycle costs, should be evaluated as
trade-offs. Other producibility concepts which will reduce
the cost of ship construction and which have no significant









MILSTD 881A (25 April 1975)
Work Breakdown Structures for Defense Material Items
MILSTD 881A is mandatory for:
- All defense material items (or major modifications)
being established as an integral program element of the
5-year Defense Plan ( FYDP )
.
- All defense material items (or major modifications)
being established as a project within an aggregated program
element where the project is estimated to exceed $100 mil-
lion in RDT&E financing, and
- All production follow-on of the above.
Functional or System Orientation
- It establishes criteria governing the preparation and
employment of WBSs
.
- It establishes a standard system-oriented family tree
of hardware, services and data.
MILSTD 881A rules and practices include the following:
- A preliminary contract WBS shall be identified in the
government's solicitation.
- The project summary WBS is structured by the DoD com-
ponent .




- The contractor shall extend the negotiated WBS to
lower levels to form a project WBS.
- Contractors may propose changes to the preliminary
WBS during negotiation.
- Preordained structure shall not be imposed on the
contractor
.
- Configuration items will be identified as WBS ele-
ments .
- Families of specifications and drawings which result
from systems engineering activities shall conform to the
evolved project WBS.
- The contract WBS shall serve as a framework for the
contractor's management control system which will provide
auditable or otherwise traceable summarizations of internal
data generated by his performance measurement procedures.
- Integrated Logistics Support shall be accommodated by
the summary level WBS.
- Reporting requirements shall be consistent with the
contract WBS.
- The lowest level of the extended contract WBS for
project planning control and support shall reflect the way
the work is actually performed. (This is not possible using
SWBS or ESWBS with today's construction methods.)
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Summary WBS and Definitions of Ship Systems as Defined
in Appendix E of MILSTD 881A
- Level 1 - Program or contract
- Level 2 - Individual ship plus services
- Level 3 - Systems or functional segments described by




S9040-AA-10X-010/SWBS 5D - 13 February 1985
ESWBS for all Ships and Ship/Combat Systems
ESWBS is mandatory for:
- Configuration identification, status accounting, spe-
cifications, design, production and maintenance where break-
down below level 3 is specified in a contract.
Functional or System Orientation
- It establishes a standard product-orientd family tree
of hardware, services and data down to level 7.
ESWBS rules and practices include the following:
- The contract WBS is identified in the solicitation.
- The project summary WBS is structured by the Navy.
- Preordained structure is_ imposed for all end items of
a program throughout its life (contrary to Appendix A).
- Configuration items will be identified as WBS ele-
ments .
- Families of specifications and drawings resulting
from systems engineering activities shall conform to the
project WBS.
- The contract WBS shall serve as a framework for the
contractor's management control system which will provide
auditable or otherwise traceable summarizations of internal
data generated by his performance measurement procedures.
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- Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) shall be accommo-
dated by the summary level WBS
.
- Reporting requirements shall be consistent with the
contract WBS.
- The lowest level of the extended contract WBS (level
7) for project planning control and support shall reflect
the way the work is actually performed.
ESWBS Organization
- Level 1 - Program or contract
- Level 2 - Individual ship plus services
- Level 3 - Systems or functional segments as defined
in MILSTD 881A
- Levels 4 through 6 - Functional description of sys-
tems/equipments




Product Work Breakdown Structure
National Shipbuilding Research Program
U. S. Department of Commerce Maritime Administration
in cooperation with Todd Pacific Shipyards Corporation
November 1980
PWBS is mandatory for:
- Any large construction project where work must be
logically subdivided in order to be readily analyzed and
managed.
- Support of zone outfitting and group technology con-
struction methods.
Product Orientation
- The interim product is viewed as the focal point of
the PWBS system.
- Classification of products is selected by the indi-
vidual shipbuilder to provide maximum improvement in produc-
tivity using the shipbuilder's facilities.
PWBS rules and practices include the following:
- It conforms with the way the ship is built.
- The focus is on needed parts and subassemblies or the
interim products which are required for larger assemblies.
- Interim products are classified by product aspects:
system, zone, area and stage as described in Section 2.3.3.
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- Use of a PWBS results in natural work packages, ideal
for planning, scheduling, and execution.
- Subdivisions are small and facilitate control of work
flow and progress reporting.
- Individual shipyards have the flexibility of estab-
lishing their own expanded work breakdown structures which
can be reflective of the way ships are actually built at
that shipyard.
PWBS Organization
- Level 1 - Program or contract
- Level 2 - Individual ship plus services
- Level 3 - Interim products (units, modules, zones or
processes, etc.)
- Levels 4 and beyond - components, subassemblies, pro-
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